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Abstract 
 
Two high-pressure bioassay vessels failed at the Savannah River Site during a microwave heating process for 
biosample testing.  Improper installation of the thermal shield in the first failure caused the vessel to burst during 
microwave heating.  The second vessel failure is attributed to overpressurization during a test run.  Vessel failure 
appeared to initiate in the mold parting line, the thinnest cross-section of the octagonal vessel.  No material flaws 
were found in the vessel that would impair its structural performance.   
 
Content weight should be minimized to reduce operating temperature and pressure.  Outer vessel life is 
dependent on actual temperature exposure.  Since thermal aging of the vessels can be detrimental to their 
performance, it was recommended that the vessels be used for a limited number of cycles to be 
determined by additional testing.   
 
Background 
 
The Savannah River Site, operated by the Washington 
Savannah River Company, a Department of Energy 
contractor, performs routine bioassay sample digestion 
for personnel testing.  Two polymeric vessels failed at 
recirded temperatures from 220-230°C and pressures 
ranging from 325 to 550 psig. The door of a microwave 
oven door glass blew out during an earlier failure.  
(Figure 1).   
 
During normal test procedures, a small bioassay sample, 
a gel-type cation resin, and concentrated nitric acid are 
placed into a PTFE (polytetraflurorethene) inner vessel 
and a thermoplastic polyetherimide (PEI) outer vessel.  
The vessel is then heated to a maximum of 220°C for a 
minimum of 35 minutes.  The maximum pressure is pre-
set at 550 psig before system shutdown during the test 
cycle.  The sample vessels are hot after the test and are 
allowed to cool down prior to safe handling.  Gel-type 
resin is used for selective separation of metals, 
specifically plutonium and americium, from the 
bioassay sample.  
 
The inner vessel is designed for temperatures up to 250 
°C (PTFE softening temperature) and for pressures up to 
625 psig.  Tests by the manufacturer revealed vessel 
failure at 1500-1700 psig at 23°C and approximately 
1200 psig at 220°C.  These tests did not include a 
pressure relief device which is normally used in 
bioassay testing.  A pressure relief disk and pressure 
relief device is normally mounted on the top of the 
vessel that releases pressure at 720 psig per 
manufacturer’s testing. The pressure relief disk did 
not release during the two vessel failures described in 
this paper.   
 
During normal testing, ten vessels are inserted in the 
microwave carousel and one of these vessels is 
connected to a pressure sensor which controls  
microwave wattage.  Power is increased 
incrementally until reaching the maximum pressure 
per test procedure.  The electronic pressure protection 
system shuts off power at a controlled 625 psig vessel 
pressure.  The control system also monitors 
temperature in the same vessel.  
 
The vessel design, Figure 2, includes an inner vessel 
with a slip on cap that holds the pressure relief 
device.  The pressure relief device includes a 
threaded nozzle with an internal hole and a pressure 
relief disk.  The threaded nozzle is made of PTFE 
(polytetrafluoroethylene) polymer while the relief disk 
is made of PFA (perfluoroalkoxy, a variation of PTFE).  
The inner vessel, containing the biomaterial, is 
machined from a modified PTFE polymer (Dyneon 
TFM™ PTFE 1700).  This vessel is inserted into the 
outer vessel, made of injection-molded polyetherimide 
GE Ultem™ 2300.  PTFE, Ultem™ and PFA polymers 
are transparent to microwave energy due to their low 
dissipation factors (ratio of the material’s power loss to 
the power transmitted through it) [3-6].  Thus, heating 
of the inner and outer vessels is due to boiling of the 
contents.  The inner vessel heats to approximately 
220°C, with the outer vessel at a lower temperature 
because of the limited thermal conductivity of polymers. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
A) First Failure 
 
Figure 3 shows that the bottom of the outer vessel 
fractured with no visible cracking in the upper part of 
the vessel.  The cap did not fail.    In Figure 4, the 
thermal shield is inserted into the bottom piece of the 
vessel in the upright position.  The top surface of the 
shield is above the fractured surface.  However, where 
the shield is shown upside down (Figure 5), the position 
of the fractured surface is near the bottom edge of the 
shield.  This substantiates the manufacturer position that 
the vessels will fail with an inverted thermal shield.  
When the thermal shield is installed correctly, the 
installed inner vessel and cap will look like Figure 4.  
When installed incorrectly, there is a slight gap, 
approximately 1/16 inch, as shown in Figure 5.  The 
upside down position of the thermal shield would 
therefore impose additional compressive stresses on the 
inner vessel. 
 
Using a thermal expansion coefficient of 1.1x 10-05 
in/in-°F for PEI [3], the thermal shield expands to a 
diameter of 1.895 inches.  This is still less than the 
minimum ID (1.901 inches) of the outer vessel.  
Thermal shield expansion is close but not sufficient to 
cause failure.  Of course, this assumes that the outer 
vessel stays at room temperature.  Using similar thermal 
expansion calculations and a thermal expansion 
coefficient of 9.4 x 10-05 in/in-°F for PTFE, the bottom 
OD of the inner vessel (1.888 inches max.) would 
expand to 1.954 inches.  Since the minimum ID at the 
bottom of the outer vessel is 1.901 inches, pressure is 
applied to the outer vessel by the inner vessel.  
Allowing for 3% elongation (ambient temperatures), the 
maximum elongated ID is 1.958 inches, still slightly 
larger than the expanded OD of the inner vessel.  
However, with an elongation of 1.55% (elevated 
temperature), the maximum elongated ID is 1.930 
inches.  Thus, the expanding inner vessel may be able to 
burst the outer vessel if pressures are excessive.  This is 
a worst case situation due to the assumption that the 
outer vessel does not grow at higher temperatures.  
One factor against this situation is that the 1.55% 
elongation value of PEI is at 150°C.  It is unlikely 
that circumferential pressure from thermal expansion 
of the thermal shield is sufficient by itself to cause 
failure.  However, the combination of thermal shield 
and inner vessel pressure may be sufficient to cause 
failure at the bottom of the outer vessel.   
 
B) Second Failure 
 
Initial observation of this failure revealed that the 
outer vessel (PEI) cracked into multiple pieces while 
the inner vessel was relatively intact (Figure 6).  
Sides of the inner vessel (PTFE) appeared to have 
blown out with failure occurring near the bottom 
(Figures 7-8).  Half of a bulge is visible on the side of 
the PTFE vessel, above the notch in Figure 8.  The 
notch also appears in the outer vessel, just below the 
notch in the inner vessel (Figure 8).  The bulge is 
further magnified in Figure 8B.  No defect in the 
PTFE is visible at this location but this could be the 
initial failure site of the PTFE.  It appears that 
pressure in the PTFE vessel caused expansion and 
ballooning, specifically at the bulge, with both 
circumferential cracking at the bottom and linear 
cracking through the bulge and other locations.  
 
In order for the PTFE vessel to expand and blow out, 
the outer vessel has to expand and fail first.  However 
outer vessel expansion is limited to only 3% at room 
temperature and less at higher temperatures.  As 
expansion increases, failure can occur due to 
overpressure and material flaws.  When the failed 
outer vessel is taped together (Figure 9), cracking 
appears to be non-linear although the cap has one 
straight edge.  In Figure 10, one crack is linear and is 
at the mold parting line.  An injection molded part 
usually displays two lines, 180° apart where the mold 
separates, similar to a clamshell.  When the 
components of Figures 9 and 10 lay side by side, the 
fracture at the mold parting line is visible (Figure 11).  
The vessel appears to open at the mold parting line.  
Further evidence of crack propagation in the mold 
parting line is visible in Figure 11.  In the thread area, 
the crack appears to propagate diagonally from the 
mold parting line.   
 
Based upon the above discussion, the outer vessel 
appeared to fail first due to overpressurization from 
expansion of the inner vessel.  Pressurization of the 
outer vessel and subsequent failure could also occur 
due to moisture in the annular space between the two 
vessels.   The addition of pressures from moisture in 
the annular space and inner vessel pressure may 
cause failure at lower than expected test pressures.  
The failures appear to have initiated near the same 
area due to the dual fracture peaks shown in Figure 8. 
SEM analysis of the fracture surfaces showed two 
different types of fractures.  One, Figure 12, shows a 
tearing type fracture (ductile) with visible fibers in the 
light color area (C) of Figure 11.  The other type 
fracture observed below the light color area, Figure 13, 
shows a flat, brittle surface with holes that are probably 
prior fiber locations.  When compared to the fracture 
surface of a deliberately failed vessel, the induced 
fracture surface (Figure 14), the surface of Figure 
13appears very similar.  Fibers are visible along with a 
few holes left behind from pulled out fibers.  Some fiber 
pullout is expected on fracture but additional pullout 
probably occurred at higher temperatures.  
 
C) Pressure Relief Device Testing 
 
A common element in these failures is that the relief 
device did not release.  Pressure testing was performed 
to determine release pressures.  The pressure relief 
device includes a threaded nozzle (Figure 15) allowing 
it to be hand threaded into the cap on the inner vessel 
and a rupture disk. The rupture disk, a solid, circular 
disk (Figure 16) made of Teflon PFA 
(polyperfluoroalkoxyethylene), is inserted in the cap 
prior to threading the nozzle.  The disk is approximately 
0.020 inch thick with a 0.315 inch diameter and deforms 
around the circumference to allow pressure release.  The 
manufacturer has tested the pressure relief device for 
pressure release at 720 psig.  An inner vessel cap was 
drilled and threaded to allow for hose attachment to a 
high pressure fitting (Figure 17).  Early testing with a 
used nozzle and new rupture disk resulted in pressures 
of 1025-1267 psig (pressure rise of 120 psig/min).  
Pressure release data is summarized in Table 3.  Heater 
tape was wrapped around the cap for testing at higher 
temperatures, 98-104°C.  Pressure release was then 
measured at 785-968 psig using a new nozzle of the old 
design and low pressure rise.  Pressure release was very 
audible and gage pressure dropped significantly.  It was 
also observed that the used nozzle was easy to hand 
thread whereas the new nozzle was more difficult.  
After testing with the new nozzle, threading was similar 
to the used nozzle.  Pressurization of the new threads 
probably caused thread deformation to allow easier fit-
up during the next use.  Doubling the pressure rise to 
240 psig/min. resulted in pressures of 1398-1428 psig 
with a used and new nozzle (old design).  Since these 
pressures were very high, a pressure rise of 120 
psig/min. was used for remaining tests.  A new nozzle 
design (Figure 18) with a flat face was also tested.  At 
room temperature, the release pressures were 832-848 
psig with gage pressures dropping very slowly.  These 
pressure values were a little higher than with the old 
design nozzle.  This is expected since the nozzle design 
has a flat head versus the bevel design on the old nozzle.  
In all tests, the rupture disk did not fail.  The disk is 
designed to deform and allow air to escape through the 
threads. 
D) Calculations  
 
Pressure vessel calculations were performed on the 
outer vessel according to hoop stresses per Roark and 
Young [9] and ASME Section VIII [10].  The 
maximum circumferential stress is 2731 psi while the 
longitudinal stress is only 1091 psi using an internal 
pressure of 550 psi.  With internal pressures of 600 
psig and 800 psig, the circumferential stress is 2980 
psi and 3973 psi, respectively [9].  The allowable 
stress level at 177°C per Table 1 is below the 
calculated stress values.  Thus, the actual pressure at 
failure of the December 13 vessel could be 
approximately 600 psig per the Roark and Young 
calculation.  The ASME calculation results in an 
allowable stress of 2340 psi at a pressure of 550 psig.  
At 600 psig pressure, the ASME allowable stress is 
2550 psi.  However, at 700 psig, the result is 2976 
psi.  This is further evidence that pressures were 
within the range of 600-800 psig at vessel failure.   
 
Material Properties 
Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) is used for the inner 
vessel (Figure 5) primarily for its superior chemical 
inertness.  The actual material is Dyneon TFM™ 
PTFE 1700, a modification of Dupont PTFE.  The 
mechanical properties of the Dyneon TFM™ PTFE 
1700 (Table 1) show that tensile strength is 
approximately 5800 psi and the elongation is 650% at 
room temperature [3].  At 204°C and 260°C, the 
tensile strength drops significantly to 1250 psi and 
870 psi, respectively.  The 870 psi value is based on 
Dupont PTFE data [4] and may be slightly higher 
than that for the Dyneon PTFE.  Elongation values 
above room temperature are not available but are 
assumed to be higher than those at room 
temperatures.  While there is no definitive glass 
transition temperature for PTFE, the softening 
temperature is 260°C and also the continuous use 
temperature for this version of PTFE.  This is above 
the standard bioassay test temperature of 220°C.  
The outer vessel and the thermal shield are injection 
molded with a polyetherimide (PEI) thermoplastic 
filled with 30% glass fiber [5].  The tensile strength 
of this polymer is approximately 4 times higher than 
the PTFE strength (Table 1) and about 8 times the 
strength at 150°C.  PEI strength above 150°C shows 
an approximate 50% reduction at 220°C.  Although 
strength is much higher than PTFE, the PEI resin is 
limited in ductility and toughness.  At ambient 
temperature, the elongation value is only 3% [5] and 
is estimated at 1.55% at 150°C.  The manufacturer’s 
product guide states that the PEI resin is suitable for 
continuous service at temperatures up to 180°C [5].  
A potential fatigue problem may exist with long term 
use of this PEI polymer at high temperatures.  The glass 
transition temperature, Tg, for the PEI material is 215°C 
(419°F) which means that increased molecular mobility 
above this temperature may cause significant changes in 
material properties [6].     
 
Data for the PEI resin show a significant reduction in 
impact strength after 40 hours of steam sterilization 
cycles (30 minutes/cycle) at 132°C per ASTM D1822 
[7].  The effect of dry sterilization at 160°C (time not 
specified) shows no effects on this particular PEI 
polymer [8].  Therefore, the presence of moisture 
appears to have significant impact upon temperature 
stability.  In addition, multiple temperature cycles above 
these temperatures may increase degradation and 
therefore the number of test cycles should be limited.  
Testing should be performed to identify this cycle limit.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Three bioassay vessels failed in the SRS bioassay 
laboratory facilities during October-December, 1999, 
The first vessel failure is attributed to incorrect 
placement of the thermal shield disk.  A bright color 
stripe is suggested for use at the top of the inner vessel 
to allow quick identification of improper placement of 
the thermal shield.  The second vessel failure is 
attributed to overpressurization based on calculations 
and failure of the pressure sensor.  No flaws were found 
in this vessel that would impair structural integrity.  
Overpressurization could be due to high inner vessel 
pressure and/or moisture in the annular space.  Although 
the failed vessel from October 2 was not available, it is 
similar in appearance to the December 13 failure and 
high pressures are suspect.  A digital display of the 
temperature and pressure may be necessary to allow the 
operator to respond to faulty sensors.  The use of 
thicker, cylindrical vessels or poly-reinforcement type 
webbing wrapped around the outer vessel would 
provide additional pressure protection.  If possible, 
content weight should be reduced to allow a lower 
operating pressure.  Since moisture can cause pressure 
in the annular space, the vessels need to be as dry as 
possible to minimize pressure buildup.  Because thermal 
aging of the vessels may be detrimental to their 
performance, it is recommended that additional tests be 
performed in order to determine the cycle life.  Testing 
is also needed to verify uniform heating and pressure 
generation at maximum temperatures for all vessel 
locations.  
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Figure 1.  One failure occurred in this microwave.  Parts of the failed vessel remained in the microwave after failure 
(shown by arrows) and the vessel carousel was also damaged. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Components of outer (a) and inner (b) vessels and caps.  The inner vessel cap (c) includes a threaded 
pressure relief nozzle (d).  Thermal shield (e) is inserted in bottom of outer vessel. 
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Figure 3.   The first vessel failure reveals full bottom head separation.  This failure mode is unique compared with 
the other failures in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.  Inner vessel shown inserted into outer   Figure 5 Inner vessel shown inserted into outer  
vessel with correctly placed thermal shield (lower photo). vessel with inverted thermal shield as shown in lower   
No gap is visible at A. photo. Note ~1/16 inch gap at B between inner vessel 
and top of outer vessel. 
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Figure 6.  Parts of the second failed vessel that were ejected from the microwave oven.  The 
outer vessel is identified by A with the inner vessel by B.  The single screw and washers are 
not part of this vessel. The round component beneath the washers is the thermal shield. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  The initiation of failure in the inner PTFE vessel (second vessel failure) appears 
to occur either circumferentially at the bottom, in a vertical direction or both. 
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Figure 8.  Inner PTFE vessel of Figure 7 is shown positioned within outer vessel.  Note matching fracture peaks in 
inner and outer vessels (A).  A bulge in the PTFE is visible at B with an enlarged view on right which is most likely 
the initial site of the PTFE vessel failure after failure of the outer vessel. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  The outer vessel from the second vessel failure showing components taped 
together.  Note that all cracks propagated along a curved path on the bottom part of 
the shell in this photo. 
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Figure 10.  Opposite side of the failed outer vessel from Figure 9 with components 
taped together.  In this case, a crack is barely visible along the mold parting line at 
arrows. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Second vessel failure.  Failed outer shell components lined up side by side to show vessel fracture 
surfaces.  The mold parting line is located at arrows marked A.  The crack appears to initiate either near B or slightly 
above it where the bulge in the PTFE vessel occurred.  At C the fracture surface appears lighter, possibly due to 
fiber orientation, stress whitening, flow characteristics, etc. 
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Negative No. EE-55041 
Figure 13.  Fracture surface at C location (light 
color) in Figure 11 showing glass fibers sticking 
out of a torn surface.   
 
Negative No. EE-55041 
Figure 12 .  Fracture surface below light color C 
location in Figure 13 showing completely different 
appearance.  The surface appears very brittle.  Round 
holes are prior fiber locations.  Note that the 
magnification is only 500X compared with 800X in 
Figure 12. 
 
 
 
 
Negative No. EE-55041 
Figure 14.  (left).  Fracture surface of induced 
failure of new vessel showing relatively flat 
surface with fibers and a few holes (A) where 
fibers were pulled out.  This fracture surface is 
similar to Figure 12 above. 
A
 
   
Figure 15.  Pressure relief nozzle types.  Type A (new design) was 
used in the October 2 failure.  Type B (old design) was used in 
both December failures.  Note the longer taper on Type B versus 
Type A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Pressure relief disk from testing.  The taper on the nozzle allowed 
disk deformation as pressure increased.  Note the rolled-up edges.  This disk 
does not rupture at normal operating pressures but distorts to allow air to escape 
around the nozzle threads. 
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Figure 17.  PTFE inner vessel cap with pressure fitting attached for testing 
rupture disk failure.  Heating tape was wrapped around the outer diameter to 
increase temperature.  The pressure relief disk is inserted at position A, beneath 
nozzle. 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
                                   
Figure 18.  Face of Type A pressure relief nozzle is flat with no ID taper.  Face diameter is approximately 5/16 inch.  
Hole diameter is approximately 0.075 inch.  Face of Type B pressure relief nozzle has a taper.  Face diameter is 
approximately 5/16 inch.  Hole diameter (B) is approximately  0.080-0.084 inch. 
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  Table 1.  Mechanical Properties of Vessel Materials 
   
                              PEI Outer Vessel    PTFE Inner Vessel   
 (30% glass reinforced) _______________  
Ultimate Tensile Strength, psi  
    23°C (73°F) 23,300  5,800  
  150°C (302°F) 14,225  
 177°C (351°F) 12,000 
  204°C (400°F)    1,247 
 190°C (374°F)   8,000 
  220°C (446°F)   8,190*  1,000* 
Allowable Strength, psi (manufacturer’s Data) 
 -20°C (-4°F)  8,000 
    0°C (32°F)  7,100 
  23°C (73°F)  6,200 
  93°C (199°F)  4,600 
 177°C (351°F)  2,900     
Elongation, %  
   23°C (73°F) 3  650 
 150°C (302 °F) 1.55  NA 
Continuous Use Temperature     
 °C (°F) 210** (410)  260 (500)   
 
* linear regression values from tensile stress vs. temperature data  
** ASTM A-648 test of deflection under 1.8 Mpa load 
 
 
 
